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Lucifermeisje (Matchstick girl) by Floris Arntzenius (1864-1925), who  
lived and worked much of his life in The Hague, the Netherlands. 
Painting of a disabled girl, who sold matches, probably standing at one  
of the entrances of the ‘Passage’ shopping mall, which opened in 1885.  
(Haags Historisch Museum, The Hague) 
She is what the welfare state has tried to support:  
a disabled child selling matches on a street corner  





The financial crisis of 2009 has had a devastating impact on the people of Europe, 
throwing millions into unemployment and poverty. The impact was most severe in the 
Southern and Eastern members of the EU. The EU’s response was more concerned with 
the impact of the crisis on the viability of the banking and financial sector than on 
employment, poverty and livelihood. Following a brief discussion of the empirical 
evidence on the social impact of the crisis, this paper provides a critical appraisal of a 
major EU initiative in 2013: the Social Investment Package (SIP). The social investment 
(SI) approach to social policy has its origin in the social democratic response to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. In Sweden Ava and Gunnar Myrdal argued for a new approach 
to social policy that would focus on social investment in human capital. Notwithstanding 
the intrinsic merits of a SI approach this paper argues that it is a policy paradigm without 
a foundation in any specific economic theory, and its adoption has been influenced by 
country specific historical, social and economic institutions and developments.  
The SIP has been primarily focused on the supply side of the labour market in order 
to increase people’s skills and their participation in the labour market and society at large. 
It also covered other related key areas of early childhood education, housing and social 
protection. The SIP has been complemented by the launch of the European Pillar of 
Social Rights that if backed up by appropriate legislation and setting up of rules similar to 
the European Monetary Union would strengthen the social dimension of the EU leading 
to a European Social Union. The EU has to balance its plan for economic and monetary 
union based on free market with its desire for social cohesion and a social union. The 
latter requires some degree of fiscal union to provide support for regions and people 
who have been left behind and have been negatively affected by the economic policies of 
the EU and member states. Social cohesion calls for asymmetric solidarity and 
redistributive policies. A Europe that has defined itself by its enlightenment and 
progressive ideas since the French revolution has to go back to the basics and invoke the 
rich intellectual heritage that aspired to ‘equality, fraternity and liberty’ for human kind. 
The idea of a social contract between citizens and the state should be put at the heart of 
economic and social policies at European level in order to mitigate and eventually 
eliminate not only the negative social impact of the crisis but move towards a more 
equitable, democratic and prosperous Europe. 
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The financial crisis, poverty and vulnerability1 
from social investment to an EU social union? 
 
1 Introduction 
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2009, the EU entered its fifth year of 
worse ever sustained and deep economic crisis in 2014 that has been followed by 
unprecedented increases in unemployment and poverty across much of the EU. There 
was very little sign of economic recovery, except very modest growth in the richer 
northern countries. Even there the economic recovery was very weak with no indication 
that fruits of recovery would be shared by the majority of population, the share of wages 
in GDP has been declining steadily in several northern European countries, notably in 
Germany. Austerity has been the order of the day in countries like the NL, Germany and 
Austria that had weathered the crisis. Centre right governments in these countries had 
legitimized their austerity programmes and imposed cuts in public expenditure or pushed 
down workers’ claim for higher wages or better living standards by arguing that budgets 
had to be balanced lest a Greek style crisis and adjustment would follow, despite the fact 
these countries, unlike Greece, had some of the most diversified and export-oriented 
economies with strong central government finances, sophisticated tax structures and tax 
collection administration in the world. Above all, the relatively progressive taxation of 
these countries had political legitimacy and public support that would have further 
legitimized more and not less public spending in order to cushion the social and 
economic impacts of the crisis. 
The EU data reveals the scale of social impact of the crisis on the people of Europe. 
Table one provides a snapshot of the extent of poverty in the EU and some other 
European countries. Based on various measures of poverty (income poverty – less than 
60 percentage of the median of equivalised disposable income after social transfers, 
severe material deprivation, or a low work intensity household) nearly a quarter (or 122.3 
million) of EU population were considered to be poor in 2014. By 2016 the percentage 
of the poor dropped slightly to 23 per cent whilst the number of the poor stood at 118 
million.  
There were wide variations across the EU with Romania and Greece having the 
largest percentage of the poor at 38.8 and 35.6 per cent respectively; and Czech Republic 
and Denmark having some of the lowest at 13.3 and 16.7 per cent respectively. The other 
important feature of poverty since the crisis has been its concentration among the 
children and adults of working age.  
 
  
                                                 
1 The author likes to thank Jeremy Leaman and Robert Salais for inspiring discussions on the 
macroeconomics of social policy in the EU. Earlier drafts of the papers were presented at the 
periodic conferences of the RE-InVest and the Euromemorandum conferences of 2017 and 
2018 (www.euromemo.eu).  Comments of participants in these conferences are gratefully 




Percentage of people at risk of income poverty (after social transfers)  
by different age groups in the EU countries, 2016. 
 
Source: EU (2019a) Eurostat. [ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/People_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_exclusion#Number_of_people_at_risk_of_pov
erty_or_social_exclusion] [Accessed: 13/02/2019] 
 
 
A similar picture of the social impact of crisis on households emerges from the data 
on unemployment. The financial crisis increased the unemployment rate from 7.2 per 
cent of the pre-crisis level of 2007 to a peak of 10.9 per cent in the EU28 and to 12 per 
cent in the EU17 (or Eurozone) countries by 2013, with the most severe impact on 
Greece and Spain where a quarter of their labour force were unemployed (Table 2). By 
2013 the level of unemployment in EU27 stood at 26 million of whom 19 million were 
8 
 
 in the EU17 (the Eurozone). More alarming is the number and percentage of those who 
are below the age of 25. In EU27 the young unemployed numbered 5.7 million of whom 
3.6 million were in the EU17 area. These figures represented about 23 per cent (nearly 
one in four) of the youth in these areas. In recent years the unemployment rate has 
started to decline in most EU countries approaching its pre-crisis rate, except for Greece, 
Spain and Italy that in 2018 still suffered unemployment rates that were nearly double the 
pre-crisis rates. (EU, 2019b)  It should be noted that historically female unemployment 
rate has been higher than the male’s but the gap has narrowed in recent years. (See Table 
3 and EU, 2019b)  
Poverty and unemployment are closely related, nearly half the poor are unemployed. 
In 2010, 45 per cent of the unemployed in the EU-27 were at-risk-of-poverty, a figure 
that reaches 48 per cent by 2016. (See Table 4, EU, 2019b) Employment however 
provides no guarantee against poverty, as the percentage of at-risk-of-poverty in 
employment in table 4 reveals. In 2016 almost one in ten poor people in the EU were in 
employment that reveals the inadequacy of wage and employment contracts to prevent 
people falling into poverty. This is further reinforced when we consider the precarious 
situation of those who are in employment. 
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2 Precarious work and vulnerability to poverty  
The financial crisis and the ensuing economic downturn have heavily tipped the balance 
further against labour and worsened employment conditions that have come in the 
aftermath of decades of deregulation of labour market following neo-liberal policies in 
most EU countries. Flexibility of labour and deregulation of labour market have been on 
the agenda of the EU countries well before the crisis, in part a consequence of the 
spectacular entry of low cost labour of Asia into the world market and the international 
competition to cut labour costs.  The financial crisis and continuing recession 
consolidated this trend towards more flexible contracts and other changes to working 
conditions that have greatly weakened labour’s bargaining position vis a vis capital. The 
reserve of army of labour, potential or actual, does wonders for restructuring and profits!  
Unemployment and precarious employment are the background to the debate on 
policies to reduce the social impact of crisis. To begin with it is important to ask what 
should be the founding principle of intervention by any social welfare system. Should it 
be based on actual state of poverty that has to be defined according to some criteria as 
used in the EU approach (based on income, material deprivation or employment 
deficiency of household) and targeted? Or should it be based on ‘vulnerability’ to poverty 
that requires intervention before people become ‘poor’?  
What is meant by ‘vulnerability’? According to the Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary (1977) ‘’vulnerable’ comes from the Latin word for wounding, vulnerabiris, and 
one of its meaning refers to ‘that may be wounded; susceptible of receiving wounds or 
physical injury’. In figurative speech it also means ‘open to attack or injury of a non-
physical nature.’ (P. 2494.) Going beyond the literal definition of vulnerability let us 
investigate how this concept is used in social policy.  
Spicker (2014) has defined vulnerability as ‘the possibility that when adverse events 
happen, the vulnerable person might suffer harm’ (p. 481). This is a rather circular 
definition, an adverse event by definition would cause ‘harm’, otherwise it is not called 
‘adverse.’ It would be better to define vulnerability by the ability of an individual or 
household to cope or manage in the face of an adverse event; that draws our attention to 
the potential of people and resources available to them to absorb the impact of an 
adverse event. For example, in the event of an adverse shock of food price inflation a 
worker on fixed wages for the duration of a contract will be vulnerable to a decline in her 
purchasing power (a decline in real wage) but any entrepreneur who can adjust price of 
goods that she sells will be able to pass on the cost of higher food prices to her 
customers. The worker is vulnerable to a price shock but the traders is not.  
Historically social welfare provisioning whether of mutual type, charity based or 
state provided have been selective with a narrow focus on those who were perceived to 
be ‘vulnerable’ and in need of support, for examples orphans, people with disability and 
unable to work, widows who depended on their late husbands for livelihood of their 
family. This is the context of targeting in social provisioning on the basis of vulnerability. 
It was this concept of vulnerability that has also been used in the shift from ‘needs-
based’ to ‘risk-based’ approach in social provisioning in the era of re-organising the 
welfare state. ‘Risk-based’ approach would focus on the ‘vulnerability’ and the 
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‘vulnerable’ who would be more at risk of certain adverse events and therefore in need of 
social protection.2   
Another approach to vulnerability that is more in line with the universalist and 
welfare state approach to social policy and poverty reduction views vulnerability not an 
attribute of individual but a group that is large enough to warrant a non-targeted 
approach. The development of welfare state was a response to mass vulnerability. Social policies that 
emerged out of the mutual and faith-based organisations underpinned by strong 
solidarity aimed to reduce vulnerability by not only improving living conditions through 
investment in health, sanitation and infrastructure, but also through establishing legal 
infrastructure to protect workers, provisioning of free mass education, support in old 
age, etc. The reduction in vulnerability was the key to the reduction of poverty over time.  
This is what we learn from history of social policy and social security in Europe. 
According to Spicker (2014):   
 
“Social security developed, in much of Europe, from mutual aid societies or trade unions, in 
which members agreed to pool their risks and share responsibilities for support. The idea of 
solidarity is seen in many countries as the basis of collective social provision: for example, 
the French Code of Social Security declares that the ‘organisation of social security is 
founded on the principle of national solidarity. It guarantees workers and their families 
against risks of every kind liable to reduce or suppress their ability to earn.’ But solidarity is 
not only about mutual aid; it can also be seen as principle of ‘fraternity’ which takes 
welfare as a form of collective activity and so the responsibility of the wider society 
rather than of individuals” (p. 217, my emphasis).  
 
In France as elsewhere in Europe, social policy aimed to:  
 
“…gradually extend the range and scope of solidarisitc network, a process of generalization. 
This has led to a patchwork quilt of services, provided on many different terms but seeking 
to ensure that nearly everyone is included. The approach to policy, then, has centred on two 
strategies: trying to identify and work within existing patterns of support, and seeking to 
integrate or ‘insert people at the margin into the available networks. In the process, a 
principle which initially referred primarily to insurance has come increasingly to 
refer to redistribution.” (Ibid., pp. 217-18, my emphasis)  
 
It is regrettable that  social policies based on solidarity with a strong redistributive 
objective has been undermined, for nearly two decades, by the introduction of risk-based 
approach, targeting and privatization of many areas of social provisioning, whilst at the 
same time precarity has increased in the labour market and with it vulnerability to 
poverty. It is important to unpack the concept of precarious work to understand its 
multi-dimensional facets and implications for vulnerability.  
There is no agreed definition for precarious work, there are certain elements of 
working conditions, like length of contract or uncertainty about labour law and dismissal 
that could turn a working situation precarious. That is why precarity has to be 
contextualized within a given set of legal and regulatory framework governing industrial 
 
                                                 
2 For further details see Kemshall (2002) pp. 77-79. The disable girl who is pictured in the 
opening page of this article is a case of a vulnerable person. 
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relations as well as rights to social security and variety of social policy instruments (like 
unemployment benefit, free or subsidised health care and education, rent subsidy) that 
provide for a decent living compatible with the standard of living in a country. (McKay, 
et al., 2102, European Foundation 2013, ITUC, 2011) With this in mind let us turn to 
some of the main indicators of precarity:  
“… inability of individuals to enforce their rights, where social insurance protection is 
absent, where health and safety is put at risk and where work does not provide sufficient 
income to enable people to live decently. Insecurity is another key element of precarity. It 
encompasses work uncertainty, income insufficiency, lack of protection against dismissal, an 
unknown length of employment and where there is uncertainty about future employment. 
Another factor that promoted precarious work was the issue of the lack of qualifications or 
a mismatch between the qualifications that workers have and those required where jobs are 
available. Thus the issue is not just one of under-qualification but increasingly, in a Europe 
whose citizens are possibly in possession of higher formal qualifications than ever, of over-
qualification in relation to the jobs on offer” (McKay, et al., 2012, pp. 8-9). 
In addition to the above we could also note what the International Metal Federation 
succinctly counts as the characteristics of precarious work: 
- “Direct hire on temporary labour contracts, 
- Hiring in labour via employment agencies or labour brokers, 
- Contracting out functions to other companies,  
- Personal labour contracts as bogus ‘self-employed’ workers, 
- Abusive probationary periods, 
- Disguised employment training contracts, 
- On call / daily hire, 
- Illegal or involuntary part-time work, 
- Home work” (ITUC, 2011) 
In 2010 the European Working Conditions Survey reported that 80 per cent of 
employment contracts in the EU27 were of indefinite duration, leaving 20 per cent or 
one in five contracted workers in a different situation (McKay, et al., 2012). The latter 
group are not all in precarious condition but their sheer number had warranted further 
investigation. Recent studies have all confirmed not only the precarious situation of this 
large cohort of workers but their worsening situation. 
Taking short-term (referred to as short-time work in figure 3) as one of the 
indicators of precarity figure 3 reveals the dramatic increase in short-term, non-
permanent work in selected OECD countries in the early years of the crisis. The rising 
unemployment since 2009 must have made the situation worse by making an ever- 





Increase in short-term work as an indicator of precarity,  
selected OECD countries, 2007 and 2009. 
 
Source: OECD (2010) quoted in ITUC (2011), p. 15. 
 
A similar picture of precarity emerges if we take the proportion of workers with 
indefinite contract as a measure of precarity. McKay, et al (2012) report that by 2010 only 
57 per cent of workers in Greece, 61 per cent in Ireland and 68 per cent in Spain had 
indefinite length contracts compared to 80 per cent on permanent and 20 per cent on 
temporary contracts for the EU27.  
There is also a gender dimension to precarity – women are affected more than men. 
Because the crisis has accelerated the process of informalisation of work, especially in 
sectors where women are overrepresented in insecure forms of work. (ITUC, 2011) 
More recent figures of the population working in precarious conditions is difficult to 
obtain, because of the lack of agreed definition on precarity across the EU, but taking 
short-term work and part-time work (see figure 4) as indicators it is clear that precarity 
has been on the increase since the crisis. 
13 
 
 Figure 4 
Trend of increasing part-time and involuntary part-time employment during the crisis, 2007-2011 
 
 
Notes: “Part-time employment: change in percentage of people employed in part-time employment 
between 2007 and 2011. 
Involuntary part-time employment: change in percentage of people in part-time employment between 
2007 and 2011) who were in part-time employment because ‘they could not find full-time employment’.” 
Source: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living Conditions (2013), Figure 9, p. 30. [Data 
from the Eurostat]. 
 
 
Precarious work is taking hold in the EU whilst the formal state social support and 
social security system are cut back with devastating effect in the Southern European 
crisis countries. A report by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
makes a powerful case on the human dimensions of the financial crisis. (IFRC, 2013)   
 
“Compared to 2009, millions more find themselves queuing for food, unable to buy 
medicines nor access health care. Millions are without a job and many of those who still 
have work face difficulties to sustain their families due to insufficient wages and 
skyrocketing prices. Many from the middle class have spiraled down to poverty. The 
amount of people depending on Red Cross food distributions in 22 of the surveyed 
countries has increased by 75 per cent between 2009 and 2012.” (IFRC, 2013: 2)   
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Nearly ten years after the crisis several indicators of social stress such as overall 
unemployment rate, youth unemployment rate, gender gap in unemployment, people at 
risk of poverty have hardly changed in most EU countries whilst the crisis countries such 
as Greece, Portugal and Spain still experiencing large scale unemployment and poverty 
rates.3  
Table 2  
Unemployment Rate, EU and selected non-EU countries, 2007-2017 (%) 
 
Source: EU (2019b) Eurostat. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/images/8/85/Unemployment_rate_2007-2017_%28%25%29_new.png]   
[Accessed: 13/02/2019]     
 
                                                 
3 For a very good and recent analysis of in-work poverty of full-time and part-time workers 




Youth Unemployment as a Percentage of Youth Labour Force (Youth Unemployment Rate)  
and as a Percentage of Total Labour Force (Youth Unemployment Ratio), EU, 2007-2017 
 
Source: EU (2019b) Eurostat. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/images/8/85/Unemployment_rate_2007-2017_%28%25%29_new.png]   
[Accessed: 13/02/2019]    
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According to the EU data (see table 2) by 2017 the overall unemployment 
rate in most EU countries had dropped to 7.9 per cent which is very close to 
the pre-crisis figure of 7.2 per cent. In the Euro area it is still well above pre-
crisis rate of 7.5 – it stood at 9.1 in 2017. In countries that have severely been 
affected by the crisis (e.g.  Portugal, Spain, Italy) the 2017 unemployment rates 
are at least about twice as high has the pre-crisis rate. Even more worrying is 
the youth unemployment in these countries that reveal a similar pattern across 
the severely affected crisis countries (see table 3). Gender does not seem to 
have any bearing on the unemployment rates which are very close for men and 
women (See table 4).    
Table 4 
Unemployment Rates by Gender, EU, 2007-2017 
 
Source: EU (2019b) Eurostat. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/images/8/85/Unemployment_rate_2007-2017_%28%25%29_new.png]   
[Accessed: 13/02/2019]    
 
 
It is not surprising that the continuing impact of the crisis would be 
reflected in the share of people at risk of poverty. As note earlier children (0-16 
years of age) and adults (17-64 years of age) had the highest risk of poverty in 
2016 (see table 1). But disaggregating poverty by employment status reveals 
that inactive and unemployed people had some of the highest risk of poverty 
in 2016 (see table 5), with nearly half (48 per cent) of the unemployed 




highest figure at 70 per cent. Moreover, nearly one in ten of employed 
population (9.6 per cent) were also at risk of poverty, with some countries 
registering higher figures: Greece at 14.1 per cent and Romania at 18.9 per 
cent.  
Table 5 
Percentage of People At-Risk-of-Poverty after Social Transfers  
by Most Recent Activity Status, EU, 2016 
 
Source: EU (2019) Eurostat. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/images/8/85/Unemployment_rate_2007-2017_%28%25%29_new.png]   




3 The EU response to the financial crisis 
The previous section provided a brief outline of the consequences of the 
financial crisis for employment, poverty and in general livelihood chances of 
the European citizens.  
The EU’s initial response to the financial crisis was more concerned with 
the impact of the crisis on the viability of the banking and financial sector than 
on employment, poverty and livelihood. Financial stability, however, has 
important implication for the stability of the real economy, employment and 
ability of states to tackle poverty.  
In the aftermath of the 2009 crisis, the EU Commission launched the 
Europe 2020 strategy that explicitly put some social issues – ‘the fight against 
poverty and social exclusion’ - as part of the long term economic objectives of 
‘employment, research and development (R&D), climate change and energy, 
education’ (EU, 2014, p. 3).  
As far as social targets of poverty, social exclusion, inequality and 
unemployment are concerned it is highly unlikely that they will be met by 2020. 
Let us recall that there has been an increase, in the number of people at risk of 
monetary poverty or experiencing material deprivation or living in jobless 
households, from 114 million in 2009 to 118 million in 2016. In 2014 the 
Commission admitted that ‘there is no sign of rapid progress to remedy this 
situation’…with… ‘the number of people at risk of poverty might remain close 
to 100 million by 2020.’ (EU, 2014, p. 14)  
To tackle this deprivation, effective social protection is needed. This 
task, it has to be emphasized, remains the responsibility of member states 
which, as a result of the financial crisis, experienced some of the worst 
economic crisis since the WWII.  Yet the member states have to design 
policies to achieve a broad set of social targets like reducing the school drop-
out rates, unemployment and poverty, with some EU support on education 
and training through the EU Social Fund. Otherwise all resources have to 
come from national sources such as taxes and state spending that come under 
direct scrutiny of the EU Commission through its economic surveillance and 
monitoring institutions and budgetary rules. It is also important to note that 
the EU members like the UK which are not in the Eurozone would be 
affected, albeit indirectly, by these budgetary rules via the financial markets. A 
deteriorating budget and balance of payments deficit, especially if they fall 
outside the EU recommended norms, may well increase the cost of borrowing 
at home and abroad for any member state that would in turn limit their room 
to increase public expenditure counter-cyclically. 
Therein lies the fundamental contradiction at the heart of the EU 
approach to welfare and social policy: meeting the needs of people is a national 
responsibility but the means, i.e. national finances, are directly managed and 
regulated at EU level (the European Central Bank), international financial 
institutions (such as IMF), or indirectly through the international financial  
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markets. Breaking financial rules and objectives are met with sanctions, whilst 
social objectives remain just ‘objectives’ with very little financial backing 
provided by the EU to achieve them.  
It was against this background that the EU launched it Social Investment 
Package in 2013 to tackle the growing poverty and social exclusion resulting 
from the Financial Crisis. We now turn to a critical appraisal of the social 
investment approach to social policy and its EU adaptation in the Social 
Investment Package.  
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4 What is social investment? 
Let us begin with a brief discussion of the genealogy of social investment in 
relation to social policy. Social investment approach to social policy has its 
origin in the social democratic response to the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
and interestingly in the debate on how to tackle fertility decline in Sweden, 
(Morel, et al., 2012) that according to Ava and Gunnar Myrdal, required a fresh 
approach to social policy in order to organise production and reproduction of 
an economy and society at large. More importantly, the Myrdals viewed social 
policy interventions as an investment and not as an expenditure, and coined 
the concept of ‘productive social policy’.4 A concept that was further 
developed by Esping-Anderson (1992) to argue against the trade-off between  
equality and efficiency – an important rationale, as far as the neo-classical 
economists are concerned, for reducing public expenditure in general and 
social expenditure in particular:  
 
“Equality was not promulgated as merely compatible with efficiency. It became, 
indeed, a precondition for its optimization: more equally distributed purchasing 
power is a precondition for macroeconomic performance; family policy is an 
investment in future human capital; the equalization of resources, such as health 
or education, is the foundation for optimal labour productivity; solidaristic wage 
policy and active manpower programs spur industrial modernization; income 
security helps overcome workers’ natural resistance to rationalization; preventive 
social policy diminishes human waste and economic costs.” (Esping-Anderson, 
1992) 
 
In passing we should also note another remarkable foresight of the 
Myrdals on the causes of fertility decline in the rich countries in the first half of 
the 20th century that has had an echo in the debate on fertility decline in the 
middle-income countries in the late 20st century.  They argued that ‘the decline 
in fertility was due to socioeconomic hardship brought about by 
industrialization and fast urbanisation: children were no longer seen as extra 
labour but as an extra cost for households and an extra burden in overcrowded 
housing. Policies were therefore needed to provide economic support to 
families – both through cash transfers and through policies supporting a 
dual breadwinner model – and to improve housing standards in order to 
promote fertility.’ (Morel, et al., 2012, p. 3, my ephasis) More importantly, and 
to the point with regard to social investment agenda of today, they argued 
against the eugenic ideas of genetic and biological determinants of quality of 
children by focusing on the socioeconomic and educational determinants of 
                                                 
4 It should note that in developing countries Myrdals’ view provided the theoretical 
foundation for investing in health and education of population and the development 




quality of children. In short: social investment in human capital leads to human 
development and improve the quality of labour force. They proposed a range 
of policies on day care centres, education, health care, various types of support 
to families and women in particular in order to improve female labour force 
participation. These are some of the policies that are currently advocated in 
many northern European countries to increase fertility and female labour force 
participation.    
Notwithstanding the theoretical and historical linkages between social 
investment, a la Myrdals, and the post WWII emergence of welfare state social 
policies and their importance for economic growth, there are some notable 
differences between the two. The most important one is the Keynesian 
demand side foundation of the post WWII welfare state and supply side focus 
of social investment. It should be noted that the supply side focus of Myrdals’ 
social investment is fundamentally different from the neo-classical supply side 
economics. The Myrdals’ supply side focuses on increasing the productive 
capacity of the economy through investment in human capital and increasing 
flexibility of the economy through social welfare, whilst the latter focuses on 
role of markets in increasing the productive capacity of the economy that 
requires reducing the role of state by cuts in expenditure (in particular social 
expenditure that are considered as ‘consumption’ rather than ‘investment’) and 
the general deregulation of the economy and markets, including the labour 
market.     
The Keynesian demand side approach has had a counter-cyclical objective 
to reduce the negative impacts of the Great Depression on aggregate demand, 
and as such it took the social organisation of household – the male 
breadwinner model – as the basis of its social policy and social intervention. 
The Myrdals’ social investment approach went beyond a male breadwinner 
model by trying to increase female labour force participation. 
The other important difference between Keynesian demand side and 
Myrdalian productive social policy approach relates to the treatment of time. 
The Keynesian approach, in so far as employment creation and social 
expenditure is concerned, is more focused on current and short-term results, 
encapsulated in Keynes’ famous phrase ‘We are all dead in the long-run’! 
Productive social investment, on the other hand, takes a long view of time by 
focusing on the long-term returns on social investment. (Jensen, 2012) Such a 
view of Keynesian approach, however, ignores the Keynesian public 
investment in infrastructure that not only creates current demand but also adds 
to the capital stock that will generate, if productively employed, a return in the 
future.   
Social investment, as a supply side policy, has seen a revival since the late 
1970s with the ascendancy of neo-liberal macroeconomic paradigm and 
policies and their impact on social policy.  The neoliberal paradigm with its 
emphasis on deregulation and budgetary restraint was coupled with a reform of 
traditional social security/income security to ‘encourage’ more labour market 
engagement through stringent conditionality of benefits payments and tax 
incentives, whilst at the same time retraining and reskilling were meant to make 
the labour force more flexible. 
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However, despite the overlap between neoliberal supply side paradigm and 
the supply side orientation of social investment, there are important differences 
between the two approaches to social policy. Social investment starts with a 
critique of the post-war male breadwinner household/family oriented welfare 
state model that provided social insurance for mostly men in stable jobs, that 
was inadequate for a changing world of post-industrial economies; where ‘new’ 
social risks have emerged resulting from  rapid technical change, skill 
obsolescence, new family structure of single parenthood, population ageing 
and care of elderly and inadequate social security support for families and in 
society at large. (Hemerijk, 2012, p. 48) Those who were impacted most by 
these changes have been the young, working women, low-skilled workers, low-
income families with children and low-income migrants. The underlying 
reasons for the impact relate to mismatch of skills of people and what market 
demands, hence poor access to well paid jobs, lack of adequate social support 
for women and men to combine family responsibilities with work, and labour 
market and social discrimination against immigrants.  In this context life 
chances of children born into low-income, unemployed and work-poor and 
immigrant households would seriously be compromised, contributing further 
to the transfer of poverty from one generation to the next; undermining the 
achievements of the post-WWII welfare state.  
It was against this background of changing risks and life chances being 
compromised that a call has been made for a life-course approach in social 
policy. According to Esping-Andersen (2002) and others a life-course 
approach would build a relationship among different types of poverty – child 
poverty, working poverty, skill obsolescence and old age poverty – and life-
chances of an individual. Whilst welfare and education of children, from an 
early age, are the focus of the life-course approach, new policies have to 
accommodate women’s desire for family and their work aspirations; thus 
blurring the line between private (family) and public (work) spheres, that were 
demarcated in the old male-bread-winner model that linked social protection to 
risks associated with male employment. (Hemerijck, 2012) The advocates of a 
life-course approach to social policy would argue for a redirection of ‘social 
expenditure away from pensions and social insurance towards family services, 
active labour market policy, early childhood education and vocational training’ 
(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 48) 
All in all ‘social investment’ like ‘welfare state’ is a policy paradigm rather 
than a coherent and homogenous body of policies. How it influences welfare 
provisioning and design of social policies depends very much on a particular 
historical and institutional context that have shaped the ‘path dependency’ of 
the welfare state.  
Moreover, bearing in mind that social investment approach has emerged 
as a critique of a Keynesian style state and demand led welfare and social 
provisioning, it shares some of the neo-liberal challenges to the welfare state, 
such as labour market rigidities, disincentive effect of unemployment benefits 
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and other welfare support and supply-side rigidities in general. But the two 
depart with regard to the role of state in welfare provisioning and 
complementarity between social investment programmes and social protection 
measure. These differences are reflected in the adoption of social investment 
approach in different countries. For example, active labour market policies 
such as skill training, job search support and limiting unemployment benefit in 
neo-liberal welfare of regimes of the US is not necessarily combined with social 
support in other areas, unlike the same supply side social investment polies 
adopted in the social democratic welfare regimes of Nordic countries with.5 
According to Hemerijck (2012) economic policies of social investment 
approach also differs from either Keynesian state-led demand management or 
neo-liberal retrenchment approaches, in so far as the social investment 
approach lacks a coherent body of economic theory. In my view the social 
investment approach could be characterized as heterodox by borrowing from 
different economic traditions, whilst being evidence based and context specific 
with regard to institutional settings (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 49). Relying on a 
Keynesian leg of countercyclical demand management, social investment 
approach argues in favour of social protection during recessions. Nevertheless, 
there is a neo-liberal tendency in the social investment approach when it comes 
to the reform of the welfare system arguing that ‘high unemployment benefits 
of short durations, coupled to strong activation incentives and obligations, 
supported by active labour market servicing policy…[an] effective policy mix 
of this kind also have a moderating effect on wage developments.’ (Ibid., p. 
50.) Hemerijck, however, argues that time limited unemployment benefit or 
conditions on welfare support are not the same as ‘making work pay’. 
Moreover, he also tries to distance the social investment paradigm from a neo-
liberal agenda by emphasizing the productive nature of social investment, 
considering health and education as investment and not consumption, while 
emphesising the importance of the state in achieving the social and economic 
goals of a social investment oriented social policy. (Ibid., pp. 53-54.) 
In my view the devil is in the details of how a social investment package is 
put together and implemented in a specific institutional setting and public 
finance constraints. The latter is well acknowledged by Hamerijck (2012):  
“The explicit reappraisal of the role of the state as a necessary social investor is 
confronted with the overriding public finance limitation, anchored in the 
Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. As long as the neoliberal 
doctrine of balance budgets and price stability continue to be viewed as sufficient 
conditions for overall macroeconomic stability, the shift towards social 
investment remains heavily constrained.”  (p. 54, my emphasis) 
And one might add, the ‘shift’ is very selective of which social investment 
policies to pursue.  
                                                 
5 This difference has to be born in mind when we discuss the EU social investment 
package and its adoption in different member states.  
24 
 
5 Social Investment Package of  the EU and its critiques 
In 2013 EU initiated its Social Investment Package in response to the growing 
poverty and social exclusion, as noted in the earlier sections. In a document 
titled ‘Towards Social Investment for Growth and Cohesion’ the EU sets out a 
social investment oriented agenda with the objectives of tackling poverty, 
social and labour market exclusions. (EU, 2013) 
In a short discussion of the challenges facing EU, several structural 
problems are identified across the member states: welfare spending and 
pressure on the public finances; demographics and skill mismatches and the 
resulting labour market imbalances:  
“Welfare systems have contributed to improving social outcomes but are 
confronted with the consequences of demographic change and of the financial 
and economic crisis. The resulting pressure on public budgets and the risk of 
structural labour market shortages in the future reinforce the need to 
modernise social policies to optimise their effectiveness and efficiency, 
and the way they are financed. It is essential to ensure the best use of existing 
resources and to avoid potential lasting adverse effects of the crisis, both in 
countries with serious fiscal constraints, as well as in the Member States that have 
more fiscal space.” (EU 2013, p. 1, my emphasis) 
We should note that it is the modernisation of the welfare programmes 
and social policies in general that are the primary concern of the EU followed 
by the related labour market imbalances. Tackling the latter goes in some way 
in providing answers to the former. Implicit in the framing of the problem is 
the concern with the expenditure side of the public finances.  
From the outset the emphasis has been on the supply side of the labour 
market with the objective of increasing people’s skills in order to enhance their 
chances of participation in the labour market and society at large; whilst also 
considering other areas for social intervention such as health, childcare, 
education and housing:  
“The social investment package focuses on a number of central issues, including 
making sure that social protection systems respond to people’s needs at critical 
moments throughout their lives. It calls for the provision of simpler and better 
targeted social policies to provide adequate and sustainable social protection 
systems. It points to the urgent necessity of upgrading active inclusion strategies 
in the Member States: such as affordable quality childcare and education, 
prevention of early school-leaving, and training and job-search assistance. 
Housing support and accessible health care are all policy areas with a strong 
social investment dimension.” (EU 2013)  
The SIP takes a life-course approach that uses two targeting principles: 
targeting specific age groups and targeting individuals on the basis of needs. 
Children are targeted for early childhood education support, but it is not clear 
whether all children would have access to childcare services, since affordability 
is added as a condition for provision. ‘Affordable childcare’ could require user 
charges and other cost recovery measures that may well curtail access.  Access 
could also be limited if public finance constraints could not provide sufficient 
childcare facilities to meet demand under a universal access system.   
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To enhance its reach and success the SIP has been linked to a range of 
other EU initiatives. One of these initiatives is the EU Social Fund (ESF) that 
has earmarked 20 per cent of its fund for social inclusion and anti-poverty 
schemes. Other initiatives are the Employment Package, the Youth 
Employment Package, Cohesion Policy and the White Paper on Pensions. 
Given the complementarity between SIP and the ESF which has an important 
bearing on the success of the SIP let us provide a short discussion of ESF.  
The origin of the European Social Fund dates goes back to the Lisbon 
Strategy which provided a well-argued case for this mainly neo-liberal labour 
market-based approach to alleviate poverty and inequality. It led to the creation 
of the European Social Fund which has become “the main instrument for 
supporting jobs, helping people get better jobs and ensuring fairer job 
opportunities for all EU citizens. It works by investing in Europe’s human 
capital – its workers, its young people and all those seeking a job.” With an 
initial budget of 10 billion euros a year it provided useful support to a wider 
range of projects (from supporting children with learning difficulties in Poland 
to tackling discrimination against Roma population) across the EU to enhance 
people’s capacities for employment and integration into the labour market. It is 
certain that some individuals and regions would benefit from ESF projects but 
it is very doubtful whether ESF could make a notable impact on the life of the 
majority of the 100 million plus population who are poor in the EU or reduce 
substantially the number of unemployed people; especially in the Southern 
European countries of Spain and Greece with unemployment rates of 27 per 
cent and 24 per cent, respectively (Eurostat, 2014).  
The reason is that unemployment in the EU is fundamentally about the 
lack of demand, rather than labour market rigidities, discrimination, etc.; 
though these conditions do play a role in unemployment among certain groups 
and regions. The other reason for the possible failure of ESF to tackle poverty, 
inequality, discrimination and unemployment is its project-based approach, 
that are not part of a strategic vision to tackle poverty and inequality which 
historically have always needed intervention in the market and de-
commodification of goods and services that are essential to people’s lives (e.g. 
health services, housing) and economic development (e.g. education and 
infrastructural development).  
The introduction of a new EU investment initiative in 2018 - The 
InvestEU – is a further boost to other EU investment programme. The idea 
behind InvestEU is to have a one stop shop for EU funding of investment 
projects and make them not only simpler but more efficient and flexible in 
order to increase job creation and innovation. “The InvestEU Fund will 
support four policy areas: sustainable infrastructure; research, innovation and 
digitisation; small and medium-sized businesses; and social investment and 
skills. InvestEU will also be flexible: it will have the ability to react to market 
changes and policy priorities that change over time.”  (EU, 2018) However, it 
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is notable that ‘the social investment and skills’ has the lowest budget 
allocation – 4 billion euros – compared with about 11.5 for each of the other 
areas.6  
The labour market policies of the SIP have been closely linked to tax and 
benefits policies with a clearly stated objective of ‘making work pay.’ The SIP 
also has a gender agenda with the objective of increasing labour force 
participation of women. 
The jury is still out on the SIP and its impact but analytical and theoretical 
critiques demand a major rethinking of the EU approach to social policy with 
the objective of moving towards an EU social union  
An important criticism of social investment is that it is more concerned 
with its impact in the future. Investment by definition takes time to provide a 
return and more importantly supply does NOT necessarily create its own 
demand, unless we believe in J. P. Say’s law! Demand conditions do matter. 
Moreover, a shift towards labour market activation policies of social 
investment during a period of tight public finance usually entails cuts in the 
overall social spending budget that undermines social spending on the current 
needs of families in economic and social distress in the hope of their increasing 
work effort and pay in the future. (Morel, et al., 2012, p. 15.) Under tight public 
finances active labour market policies are closer to a neo-liberal ‘workfare’ or 
‘make work pay’ policy than re/up-skilling and the development of more and 
better paid jobs. (Bonoli, 2012) Further criticism of the social investment 
relates to its neglect of social inclusion and cohesion within and between 
member states that is a by-product of strict budgetary rules of the monetary 
union and soft proposal to achieve social objectives (Lundvall and Lorenz, 
2012) that remain a responsibility of the member states under the rules of 
subsidiarity.  
Critiques also point to the ‘instrumentalist’ approach of the social 
investment agenda both with regard to its objective of increasing flexibility in 
the labour market and increasing female labour force participation as well as its 
general objective of economic growth. The ‘work-life-balance’ oriented policies 
of social investment are less about creating a gender balance in family/home 
based unpaid work responsibilities than creating a more flexible labour market 
and increasing female labour force participation. The social investment focus 
on the importance of education and skills of current generation for their future 
contribution to growth objective, a valid goal in its own right, may well 
undermine the right-based approach of a universalist approach to social policy 
that focuses on the social rights of citizens, including children, their need and 
the importance of redistribution to achieve equality, solidarity and social 
cohesion. (Morel, et al., 2012, p. 16.) 
 
                                                 
6 “The InvestEU will run between 2021 and 2027 and it builds on the success of the 
Juncker Plan's European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) by providing an EU 
budget guarantee to support investment and access to finance in the EU. InvestEU 
aims to trigger €650 billion in additional investment.” (EU, 2018) 
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Active labour market policy (ALMP) of the SIP have also come under 
scrutiny. Bonoli (2012) argues that ALMP is an ambiguous policy framework 
because it can be shaped by different objectives and different passive 
unemployment benefit systems. His study of ALMP across six countries 
(Denmark, Sweden, Germany, France, UK and Italy) with different welfare 
regimes, and over three periods of rapid growth and labour shortages (1950 to 
mid-1970s), sluggish growth and industrial restructuring (mid-1970s to mid-
1990s) and improved economic and labour market conditions (mid-1990s to 
late 2000s) yields interesting lessons for the analysis of SIP and its implications 
for ALMP.  
For example, in the 1950s to early 1970s Sweden, Italy, Germany and 
France followed an upskilling ALMP in order to supply the necessary labour 
for the expanding industries. In the mid-1970s to mid-1990s slow growth and 
industrial restructuring, Sweden, Germany and France followed an ALMP 
geared towards providing alternatives to market employment. In the mid-
1990s to late 2000s with improving economic and labour market conditions 
the thrust of ALMP was towards employment assistance and work 
incentives. The range of ALM policies differed across these periods and 
countries that included ‘non-intervention’ that paid ‘passive benefits,’ ‘weak 
intervention’ that covered job creation and non-employment related training 
programmes, and ‘strong intervention’ of provision of basic education. The 
‘non-intervention’ type policies included ‘incentive reinforcements’ such as tax 
credits and various types of unemployment benefits conditionality (with regard 
to, e.g., duration and amount); ‘weak interventions’ types included 
‘employment assistance included placement services, job subsidies, counselling 
and job search programmes; whilst ‘strong intervention’ types included 
‘upskilling’ included job-related vocational training. (Bonoli, 2012, table 7.1, p. 
184.) 
The above survey and categorization of ALMP policies shows that social 
investment type policies have been on the agenda of labour market 
intervention in different countries for a long time. That could provide 
important lessons for the current labour market problems in the EU which is 
facing a simultaneous shortage of high-skilled labour and over-supply of low-
skilled labour; a situation which is similar to what some of the Bonoli’s 
surveyed countries faced in the past.  
During the growth period of 1950s and 1960s upskilling was a major plank 
of ALMP because a growing economy could pay for re/up-skilling and there 
were a lower skill gap between low-skilled and high-skilled labours of the past 
– it was easier and cheaper to retrain a forestery worker for an industrial job in 
Sweden than retrain the same worker for care/service or knowledge based 
industries of today. Current ALMP in the EU, in a period of austerity and 
retrenchment, on the other hand is more geared towards promoting entry into 
the low skilled segments of the labour market (Bonoli, 2012, p. 201) which, in 
my view, is facing an over-supply not only from within the national labour 
markets because of industrial restructuring and information based 
technologies, but also the mobility of low-skilled labour within the EU. In the 
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words of Bonoli (2012) “standard compensatory measures (tax credits, family 
benefits) alone are unlikely to prevent poverty, child poverty and the 
transmission of disadvantage across generations: precisely the devils that social 
investment advocates want to get rid of.” (p. 201) 
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6 From social investment to European social union:  
missing links? 
In more recent years reflections on the SI in general and SIP in particular have 
been combined with the EU initiative of the ‘European Pillar of Social Rights’ 
(EPSR) as part of the debate on EU Social Union.  
A fundamental question, that still hangs in balance, is whether the EU is 
stuck in an instrumentalist, piecemeal approach to social policy with its decades 
long adherence to the principle of subsidiarity “…[that it is the member] states’ 
responsibility to tackle their nations poverty and inequality, albeit with EU 
support. A subsidiarity policy that has come unstuck because of the inherent 
contradiction, as I noted earlier, of ‘the challenge of reconciling adequacy of 
social protection with financial sustainability, including for the self-
employed and non-standard workers.” (Vanhercke, et al., 2018, p. 12, my 
emphasis.) This contradiction was starkly demonstrated in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis of 2008 especially in the crisis hit countries of the Southern 
Europe. The introduction of the SIP was in part a response to this 
contradiction; that have been complemented by EPSR. 
The EPSR (see Appendix 2 of this paper) which was ratified in 2017 is 
enshrined in 20 key principles in three areas of: 
- Equal opportunities and access to the labour market;  
- Fair working conditions; 
- Social protection and inclusion. 
This is an important step in the introduction of a right-based approach in 
social policy and social protection in the EU; (Ferrera, 2018) that if combined 
with other economic and social policies at EU and national levels could 
strengthen the social dimension of the EU and contribute to achieving a Social 
Union. Vanhercke, et al. (2018) consider several conditions for the success of 
EPSR: “(a) its capacity to ‘revamp’ the EU social agenda; (b) its capacity to 
steer the direction of Member States’ policies, notably through the European 
Semester; and (c) the possibility of it influencing EU economic policies. The 
authors also compare the Pillar with the previous EU social policy framework 
– the Social Investment Package – to identify the elements of continuity and 
discontinuity.” (P. 11, for further details see Sabato, and Corti, 2018) It is the 
linking of social objectives and social policies at EU level, on the one hand, 
and macroeconomic policies, on the other, that lie at the heart of an EU Social 
Union.  
In this context an EU Social Union has to go beyond the social 
dimensions of the Single Market, and address the divergence of monetary and 
fiscal policies of member states under the European Monetary Union and the 
Eurozone rules, according to which monetary policy is centralised under the 
European Central Bank whilst the fiscal and structural policies continue to 
remain the responsibility of national governments, with no Eurozone budget 
(Andor, 2017). This divergence may not be a problem during the upswing of  
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an economic cycle but would create problems during downswing and specially 
a crisis period, as experienced by the Southern members of the EU like 
Greece.7  
The critical implication of a monetary union among nations with different 
economic and regulatory structures, not to mention different social and 
political histories, is the fact that currency devaluation would no longer be 
available to members as an instrument to deal with external and internal 
imbalances. The burden of correcting such imbalances would fall on the so 
called ‘internal devaluation’ which in plain English means retrenchment, 
reduction in real wages and real incomes in order to reduce domestic 
consumption and imports and to increase exports. This proved to be 
devastating for Greece post 2009 financial crisis. 
Another important implication of a monetary union in the context of the 
Single Market with free mobility of goods, labour and capital has been the 
problem of what Stiglitz (2016) has noted as a ‘place-based’, i.e. country based, 
debt (in the single currency) and low capacity to service the debt in future, if 
indebted country faces large scale emigration and internal devaluation (a 
consequence of monetary union) whilst at the same it were to follow orthodox 
structural adjustment programmes of retrenchment, pro-cyclical cuts in public 
expenditure to reduce budget deficit.  
The EU’s response to the crisis was regulation of financial sector, fiscal 
consolidation and structural reforms that failed to raise demand for labour 
sufficiently. The consequences of a social investment package are yet to be 
assessed. Andor (2017) has correctly noted ‘the disinflationary bias in monetary 
policy, and its bias towards internal devaluation’ (p. 150) that in my view have 
made the response to the crisis rather ineffective at least with regard to 
increasing demand in general and demand for labour in particular, especially in 
the crisis hit Southern members.  
Regarding the social impact of the crisis Andor (2017) makes two 
important and poignant observations. He does not consider the social crisis ‘a 
matter of subsidiarity’ (p. 151) that in the EU language means a matter for the 
member states to resolve. The national welfare systems could not provide an 
answer to the social consequences of the crisis, considering the budgetary and 
public finance constraints of a Eurozone macroeconomic response to deal 
with such Eurozone imbalances. Like the EU-wide reach of the Eurozone 
macroeconomic policies, the response to the social consequences of 
unemployment and declining welfare supports should also become EU-wide.  
The main policy proposals that emerge from this discussion are to do with 
an EU-wide unemployment insurance scheme and the development of EU 
fiscal stabilisation instruments that could help countries during episodes of 
fiscal problems. (Andor, 2017, Stiglitz, 2016, Vanhercke, et al., 2018) These are 
doable and necessary measures to address asymmetric imbalance and 
divergences within the EU that have had very important and negative 
                                                 
7 For further discussion of the problems of an economics of monetary union without 
a fiscal union and its impact on the EU see Andor (2017), pp. 146-148. 
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implications for the people in the EU as well as the very raison d’etre of the 
EU. It is legitimate to ask whether EU is an EU for competition and prosperity 
of capital or an EU for solidarity and prosperity of people?     
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7   Conclusion 
The depth of the economic crisis and social pressures of high unemployment, 
low wages, falling living standards, not to mention the right-wing populist anti-
EU nationalists knocking on neighbourhood doors as well as parliamentary 
doors across the EU call for urgent action on the part of the Commission to 
put the social objectives at heart of the EU short term and medium term 
economic policies.  
What is required is a radical and differentiated approach to state finances 
and the strengthening of social programmes to prevent further fragmentation 
and re-commodification in the supply of public services through measures 
such as part-privatisation (‘public-private partnership) and voucher schemes.  
The EU in line with its 2020 programme anti-poverty programme should 
channel some of the ESF annual budget to support national level and state led 
welfare schemes in support of long term unemployed, disadvantaged and 
marginalised groups. To prevent financial profligacy, it could ask for matching 
fund/resource support by the recipient country. The Eurozone budgetary rules 
(3 per cent cap on budget deficit) should be relaxed for countries with high 
level of unemployment and high number of people in poverty or at risk of 
poverty (e.g. Greece and Spain) so long as the extra money available were to 
finance key health and welfare expenditures. To avoid profligacy such 
expenditure could be monitored as part of the EU financial surveillance 
infrastructure. In short the EU Semester should not be only about financial 
monitoring of Eurozone members but social monitoring in order to provide 
support to social policy where and when it is needed. This might help to 
change the current view of the EU in some member state where the EU is 
either seen as an over-bearing regulator or a financial watchdog.  
Andor (2017) distinguishes between the social dimension of the Single 
Market and that of the EMU [European Monetary Union]. In his view the 
social dimension of the Single Market is about legislations whereas the social 
dimension of the EMU is about fiscal and monetary instruments. That in turn 
calls for the monetary union to be aligned with the national welfare policies 
systems as well as paying attention to the automatic stabilisation roles of the 
monetary policy. Whilst the distinction is important in terms of the EU legal 
and administrative structure, in my view activation of EU legislation with 
regard to any Social Union issues, such as an EU-wide unemployment 
insurance has to be built into the relationship between the Single Market and 
EMU, in other words the Single Market should provide the legal basis of any 
intra-EU transfers in line with a restructured EMU rules; that at times of crisis, 
should go beyond the Stabilisation Growth Pact rules that limit Eurozone 
members’ budget deficit to 3 per cent of GDP and national debt to GDP ratio 
of 60 per cent. It is no exaggeration that ‘[not only] the social dimension of the 
EMU is crucial for the legitimacy of the European project but also – given the 
deepening economic governance – for the legitimacy of Member States.’ 
(Andor, 2017, p. 158)   
33 
 
As a final word one has to ask a basic question that relates to the way in 
which Europe wants to view itself. A Europe that has defined itself by its 
enlightenment and progressive ideas since the French revolution has to go 
back to the basics and invoke the rich intellectual heritage that aspired to 
‘equality, fraternity and liberty’ for human kind. The idea of a social contract 
between citizens and the state should be put at the heart of economic and 
social policies at European level in order to mitigate and eventually eliminate 
not only the negative social impact of the crisis but move towards a more 
equitable, democratic and prosperous Europe.  
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Appendix 1: EU Social Fund (ESF) 
 
“What is the ESF? 
The ESF is Europe’s main instrument for supporting jobs, helping people get 
better jobs and ensuring fairer job opportunities for all EU citizens. It works 
by investing in Europe’s human capital – its workers, its young people and all 
those seeking a job. ESF financing of EUR 10 billion a year is improving job 
prospects for millions of Europeans, in particular those who find it difficult to 
get work. 
The European Union is committed to creating more and better jobs and a 
socially inclusive society. These goals are at the core of the Europe 2020 
strategy for generating smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the EU. The 
current economic crisis is making this an even more demanding challenge. The 
ESF is playing an important role in meeting Europe’s goals, and in mitigating 
the consequences of the economic crisis – especially the rise in unemployment 
and poverty levels. 
Setting priorities 
The European Commission and EU countries in partnership set the ESF’s 
priorities and how it spends its resources. One priority is to boost the 
adaptability of workers with new skills, and enterprises with new ways of 
working. Other priorities focus on improving access to employment: by 
helping young people make the transition from school to work, or training 
less-skilled job-seekers to improve their job prospects. Indeed, vocational 
training and lifelong learning opportunities to give people new skills form a 
large part of many ESF projects. 
Another priority focuses on helping people from disadvantaged groups to 
get jobs. This is part of enhancing ‘social inclusion’ – a sign of the important 
role that employment plays in helping people integrate better into society and 
everyday life. The financial crisis has led to a redoubling of efforts to keep 
people in work, or help them return to work quickly if they lose their jobs. 
Projects for people 
The ESF is not an employment agency – it does not advertise jobs. Rather, it is 
funding tens of thousands of local, regional and national employment-related 
projects throughout Europe: from small projects run by neighbourhood 
charities to help local disabled people find suitable work, to nationwide 
projects that promote vocational training among the whole population. 
                                                 





There is a great variety in the nature, size and aims of ESF projects, and they 
address a wide variety of target groups. There are projects aimed at education 
systems, teachers and schoolchildren; at young and older job-seekers; and at 




Appendix 2: The European Pillar of Social Rights in 20 principles 
“The Pillar of Social Rights is about delivering new and more effective rights 
for citizens, built upon 20 key principles. 
The Pillar of Social Rights is about delivering new and more effective 
rights for citizens. It builds upon 20 key principles, structured around three 
categories: 
 Equal opportunities and access to the labour market 
 Fair working conditions 
 Social protection and inclusion 
 
Chapter I: Equal opportunities and access to the labour market 
1. Education, training and life-long learning  
Everyone has the right to quality and inclusive education, training and life-long 
learning in order to maintain and acquire skills that enable them to participate 
fully in society and manage successfully transitions in the labour market. 
 
2. Gender equality  
Equality of treatment and opportunities between women and men must be 
ensured and fostered in all areas, including regarding participation in the labour 
market, terms and conditions of employment and career progression. 
Women and men have the right to equal pay for work of equal value. 
3. Equal opportunities 
Regardless of gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation, everyone has the right to equal treatment and opportunities 
regarding employment, social protection, education, and access to goods and 
services available to the public. Equal opportunities of under-represented 
groups shall be fostered. 
 
4. Active support to employment  
                                                 
 Source: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-
monetary-union/european-pillar-social-rights/european-pillar-social-rights-20-principles_en  
[Accessed 30 May 30, 2019] 
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Everyone has the right to timely and tailor-made assistance to improve 
employment or self-employment prospects. This includes the right to receive 
support for job search, training and re-qualification. Everyone has the right to 
transfer social protection and training entitlements during professional 
transitions. 
Young people have the right to continued education, apprenticeship, 
traineeship or a job offer of good standing within 4 months of becoming 
unemployed or leaving education. 
People unemployed have the right to personalised, continuous and consistent 
support. The long-term unemployed have the right to an in-depth individual 
assessment at the latest at 18 months of unemployment. 
 
 
Chapter II: Fair working conditions 
5. Secure and adaptable employment  
Regardless of the type and duration of the employment relationship, workers 
have the right to fair and equal treatment regarding working conditions, access 
to social protection and training. The transition towards open-ended forms of 
employment shall be fostered. 
In accordance with legislation and collective agreements, the necessary 
flexibility for employers to adapt swiftly to changes in the economic context 
shall be ensured. 
Innovative forms of work that ensure quality working conditions shall be 
fostered. Entrepreneurship and self-employment shall be encouraged. 
Occupational mobility shall be facilitated. 
Employment relationships that lead to precarious working conditions shall 
be prevented, including by prohibiting abuse of atypical contracts. Any 
probation period should be of reasonable duration. 
 
6. Wages  
Workers have the right to fair wages that provide for a decent standard of 
living. 
Adequate minimum wages shall be ensured, in a way that provide for the 
satisfaction of the needs of the worker and his / her family in the light of 
national economic and social conditions, whilst safeguarding access to 
employment and incentives to seek work. In-work poverty shall be prevented.   
All wages shall be set in a transparent and predictable way according to 




7. Information about employment conditions and protection in case of 
dismissals 
Workers have the right to be informed in writing at the start of employment 
about their rights and obligations resulting from the employment relationship, 
including on probation period.  
Prior to any dismissal, workers have the right to be informed of the 
reasons and be granted a reasonable period of notice. They have the right to 
access to effective and impartial dispute resolution and, in case of unjustified 
dismissal, a right to redress, including adequate compensation. 
 
8. Social dialogue and involvement of workers  
The social partners shall be consulted on the design and implementation of 
economic, employment and social policies according to national practices. 
They shall be encouraged to negotiate and conclude collective agreements in 
matters relevant to them, while respecting their autonomy and the right to 
collective action. Where appropriate, agreements concluded between the social 
partners shall be implemented at the level of the Union and its Member States. 
Workers or their representatives have the right to be informed and 
consulted in good time on matters relevant to them, in particular on the 
transfer, restructuring and merger of undertakings and on collective 
redundancies. 
Support for increased capacity of social partners to promote social 
dialogue shall be encouraged. 
 
9. Work-life balance 
Parents and people with caring responsibilities have the right to suitable leave, 
flexible working arrangements and access to care services. Women and men 
shall have equal access to special leaves of absence in order to fulfil their caring 
responsibilities and be encouraged to use them in a balanced way 
 
10. Healthy, safe and well-adapted work environment and data 
protection 
Workers have the right to a high level of protection of their health and safety 
at work. 
Workers have the right to a working environment adapted to their 
professional needs and which enables them to prolong their participation in 
the labour market. 




Chapter III: Social protection and inclusion 
11. Childcare and support to children  
Children have the right to affordable early childhood education and care of 
good quality. 
Children have the right to protection from poverty. Children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds have the right to specific measures to enhance 
equal opportunities. 
 
12. Social protection 
Regardless of the type and duration of their employment relationship, workers, 
and, under comparable conditions, the self-employed, have the right to 
adequate social protection. 
 
13. Unemployment benefits  
The unemployed have the right to adequate activation support from public 
employment services to (re)integrate in the labour market and adequate 
unemployment benefits of reasonable duration, in line with their contributions 
and national eligibility rules. Such benefits shall not constitute a disincentive 
for a quick return to employment. 
 
14. Minimum income 
Everyone lacking sufficient resources has the right to adequate minimum 
income benefits ensuring a life in dignity at all stages of life, and effective 
access to enabling goods and services. For those who can work, minimum 
income benefits should be combined with incentives to (re)integrate into the 
labour market. 
 
15. Old age income and pensions 
Workers and the self-employed in retirement have the right to a pension 
commensurate to their contributions and ensuring an adequate income. 
Women and men shall have equal opportunities to acquire pension rights. 
Everyone in old age has the right to resources that ensure living in dignity. 
16. Health care  
Everyone has the right to timely access to affordable, preventive and curative 
health care of good quality. 
 
17. Inclusion of people with disabilities  
People with disabilities have the right to income support that ensures living in 
dignity, services that enable them to participate in the labour market and in 
society, and a work environment adapted to their needs. 
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18. Long-term care  
Everyone has the right to affordable long-term care services of good quality, in 
particular home-care and community-based services. 
 
19. Housing and assistance for the homeless 
a. Access to social housing or housing assistance of good quality shall be 
provided for those in need. 
b. Vulnerable people have the right to appropriate assistance and protection 
against forced eviction. 
c. Adequate shelter and services shall be provided to the homeless in order to 
promote their social inclusion. 
 
20. Access to essential services 
Everyone has the right to access essential services of good quality, including 
water, sanitation, energy, transport, financial services and digital 
communications. Support for access to such services shall be available for 
those in need.”  
 
